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I.' OVERVIEW
Although fictional characters have become an increasingly per-
vasive part of American culture, they still do not enjoy well defined
legal protection against infringement. Since copyright law may not
provide adequate protection for fictional characters, plaintiffs and
courts must often rely on alternative doctrines, such as trademark
or publicity rights, to secure protection for fictional characters.
While these alternative doctrines may fill some of the voids left
open by copyright law, they are often misinterpreted and inconsis-
tently applied. In fact, even when correctly applied, these alterna-
tive doctrines still fail'to adequately protect characters. This arti-
cle will explore the availability and weaknesses of copyright law
and alternative doctrines in protecting fictional characters, and
briefly examines the argument for establishing a separate legal cat-
egory specifically for fictional characters.
II. INTRODUCTION
In general, current copyright law protects the EXPRESSION of
ideas, rather than the IDEAS themselves. The distinction, however,
between an idea and its expression is often quite elusive, and there
is still no definitive standard to distinguish an "idea" (i.e., a talk-
ing mouse character type) from an "expression" (i.e., the Mickey
Mouse character). This difficulty in distinguishing an "expression"
from an "idea" has been recognized by the courts. One example is
the Second Circuit's conclusion that "any test will necessarily be
vague. . .[and] [o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when
an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has borrowed
1
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its expression. Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."1
Further difficulties arise in defining fictional characters as the
characters, themselves, evolve and change. Fictional characters
may consist of many different elements, and may change in physi-
cal appearance, personality and mannerisms. For instance, Mickey
Mouse has "softened" over the years,2 .while Superman has become
more "personable," attractive, and more interested in women.3
III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND PROTECTION
A. Background
The infringement of fictional characters is usually analyzed
under copyright law. However, copyright law does not provide
clear or consistent protection for fictional characters. In fact, the
federal Copyright Act of 1976" does not explicitly recognize fic-
tional characters, nor include them in its list of exclusive rights. 5
Even Nimmer's four volume treatise on copyright law devotes only
one small section to fictional characters.6 Copyright is a legal de-
vice enabling authors to control the use of their intellectual cre-
ations.7 The primary purpose of copyright protection is to en-
courage creativity and the dissemination of creative works so the
public may benefit from the labor of authors." The Copyright Act
provides broad protection for original works fixed in a "tangible
medium."9 The 1976 Amendment eliminated the actual "publica-
tion" requirement which the original 1909 Copyright Act estab-
1. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 498 (2d Cir. 1960).
See also, Judge Learned Hand's opine that, "the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbi-
trary, [but] that is no excuse for not drawing it." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). See infra text accompanying
notes 14-18.
2. See S. Gould, "A Biographical Homage to Mickey Mouse," in The Panda's Thumb
95 (1980).
3. G. Grossman, Superman, Serial to Cereal 8 (1977); See also D. Petrou, The Making
of Superman, The Movie, (1978).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102 et. seq (1988).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106 at 113.
6. Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.12 at 2-171-2-
178.20 (1991) [hereinafter Nimmer].
7. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law 3-6 (1961)(quoted in A. Latman, R. Gorman & J. Ginsburg, Copyrights for The Eight-
ies 11 (1985)).
8. Id. at 13. See also Nimmer, § 1.03[A]; Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Serv.
Co., 768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985)("The copyright laws are designed to give people in-
centives to produce new works.[citation omitted] They allow people to collect the reward for
their contributions.").
9. 17 U.S.C § 102(a).
[Vol. 9:331
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lished, 1° but the Act still does not directly address fictional
characters.
Copyright protection begins as soon as a work is fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.11 Copyright protects characters
only when they appear as copyrightable components of preexisting
works, but does not provide any express protection for the charac-
ters themselves.12 Because the character does not have a "tangible
existence," copyright law does not recognize nor protect the char-
acter outside the specific copyrighted work in which it appears.
B. The Two-Part Test for Infringment
Courts have adopted a two-part test to determine copyright
infringement of a fictional character. This test requires courts to
determine whether the character's expression is copyrightable; and,
if it is, whether there is an infringement of this expression?' S
Is the fictional character copyrightable? A character must
first establish that it is able to be copyrighted in order to maintain
a copyright infringement action. A character becomes copyright-
able when the character, as originally conceived and presented, has
been sufficiently developed (i.e., "distinctly delineated") to war-
rant copyright protection, outside or apart from the story in which
it appears. The seminal case for this determination is Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.,'4 where Judge Learned Hand ruled that
characters may be protected "quite independently of the plot
proper.'15 Judge Hand also noted that "[i]t follows that the less
developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; [and]
that [this] is the penalty an author must bear for marking [the
characters] too indistinctly.' 6 Judge Hand further noted that the
point of infringement is difficult to identify, especially when the
alleged plagiarist has taken an abstract work as a whole, rather
than taking any specific block of a work: "[n]obody has ever been
10. Id. §§ 101-119. The original Copyright Act of 1909 required publication to protect
a writing. Copyright Act, ch. 320 § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102, 103.).
11. 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (emphasis added).
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. See Nimmer, § 2.12 n.2.
13. See Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-173; See also, Zambito v. Paramount Pictures, 613
F.Supp. 1107, 1111-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985); Warner Bros. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F.Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1983).
14. 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). (Nichols, the author of the play Abie's Irish Rose
alleged her copyright had been infringed by Universal's movie The Cohens and Kelleys).
15. Id. at 122.
16. Id.
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able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." 17
Although the Nichols ruling extended copyright protection to
the particular expression of a character, it did not protect the idea
itself. Thus, copyright protection applies to a "distinctively deline-
ated" character expression, but not when the similarity is found
only in the idea or character type. 8
This "distinctively delineated" test has become the general
standard in character infringement cases. For example, in Olson v.
National Broadcasting Co.,19 the Ninth Circuit held Olson's televi-
sion series "Cargo" did not infringe upon NBC's "The A-Team,"
because the A-Team characters failed to achieve the level of de-
lineation to warrant copyright protection.20 The court did, how-
ever, acknowledge that copyright protection would apply if the
characters in question had reached the required level of distinc-
tion. This was in reference to similar decisions by the Ninth Cir-
cuit (Disney cartoon characters), and the Second Circuit
(Superman) .21
The Nichols standard was also applied to afford protection for
Tarzan, because the character was "sufficiently delineated by the
author to be copyrightable."22 However, copyright law would not
have protected Tarzan if the court had found he had not become
"sufficiently delineated." Superman has likewise been found to
"embody an arrangement of incidents and literary expressions
original with the author,"23  therefore warranting copyright
protection.2
Even a character which has become sufficiently developed may
still be precluded from copyright protection by the "Scenes a
faire" exception. "Scenes a faire" are "incidents, characters, or set-
tings which are indispensable, or at least standard, in the treat-
ment of a given topic."2 5 The Ninth Circuit used this doctrine in
17. Id. at 121.
18. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
See Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-171.
19. 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. Id. at 1451.
21. Id. at 950.
22. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 388, 391, afl'd, 683 F.2d
610 (2d Cir. 1982).
23. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Burns Publications, 111 F.2d 432; 434 (2d Cir. 1940).
24. Id.
25. Atari Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)(quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F.Supp. 40, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also, 3 Nimmer § 13.13(A).
[Vol. 9:331
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deciding Olson,26 finding "those similarities that do exist arose
from unprotectable scenes a faire. '27
After establishing the copyrightability of a fictional character,
the character's owner must then demonstrate an actual infringe-
ment, rather than just a general "borrowing of ideas, in order to
receive copyright protection. In other words, "did the infringer
copy such [specific] development, and not merely a broader and
more abstract outline? '28
Intentional copying may be very difficult to prove directly, and
must usually be inferred by indirect evidence.29 The primary test
used to determine infringement is by comparing the degree of sub-
stantial similarity between the original character and the alleged
infringer (rather than a pure copyrightable per se test)."
Difficulties arise, however, in distinguishing the point where
similarities become substantial enough. to constitute copyright in-
fringement. For instance, sufficient similarity in appearance alone
has sometimes been found to warrant infringement of characters
such as Sparky the horse,3 1 Betty Boop,3 2 Mickey Mouse,33
Tarzan,34 and the Peanuts characters.3 Other cases, however, have
further required a showing of similarity in character traits or per-
sonality, beyond mere physical appearance. For example, the Lin-
coln-Mercury cartoon cougar was found not to be an infringement
upon United Artists' Pink Panther, because the two cat figures ex-
hibited different character traits. 6 These examples typify the in-
consistency and uncertainty of the standards used in determining
the outcome of any fictional character infringement issue.
IV. ISSUES AND WEAKNESSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Although copyright law does provide fictional characters with
26. 855 F.2d 1446.
27. Id. at 1453.
28. See Nimmer, § 2.12.
29. Id. See also, Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F.Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)("the proper focus ... lies not on the quality of the original characters but on estab-
lishing whether the allegedly infringing characters can be said to be "copied" from the
original.").
30. Nimmer, § 2.12.
31. King Features Syndicate v. Fleisher, 299 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
32. Fleisher Studios v. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S.
717 (1934).
33. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
34. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
35. United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D. Fla.
1983).
36. United Artists v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F. Supp. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
1992]
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a base of protection, it still leaves many voids in preventing in-
fringement. This section reviews these major weaknesses.
1. Separating Characters From Their Work
Fictional characters are generally viewed as components of the
works in which they appear. This view leaves a major gap in pro-
tecting characters outside of their original work, as any character
may appear in numerous works and may also come into existence
before being included in its copyrighted work.
The seminal case in this area is Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,37  (hereinafter "Sam
Spade"). Dashel Hammet, author of the Sam Spade novels, had
assigned the entire copyright of The Maltese Falcon to Warner
Brothers, but still continued to use the character Sam Spade, and
assigned the right to use the character to other parties (including
CBS). Warner Brothers charged that CBS's use of Sam Spade in
their 1946 "The Adventures of Sam Spade" radio show infringed
upon Warner's copyright. Warner claimed that it had sole proprie-
torship to the Sam Spade character as part of its Maltese Falcon
copyright.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Warner's claim and held that the
Sam Spade character was not protectable, because a "character
may only be protected under copyright law if the character consti-
tutes the story being told, but if the character is the chessman in
the game of telling the story, he is not within the area of the pro-
tection afforded by copyright."38 Warner's rights in Sam Spade did
not include the right to use the character in future stories, because,
even if Hammet had assigned his complete rights in the copyright
to Warner, "such assignment did not prevent the author from us-
ing the characters . . . in other stories. The characters were vehi-
cles for the story told, and the vehicles did not go with the sale of
the story."39 The court reasoned that the author was not trying to
prevent infringement by Warner Brothers, but was merely fighting
to retain his right to use his own character." As a result, Warner
retained its exclusive rights to The Maltese Falcon (even against
the original author) and the author retained his right to use his
character in other works, so long as these uses did not infringe on
the particular original work which had been copyrighted to
37. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
38. Id. at 950.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 948.
[Vol. 9:331
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Warner. Thus, the Ninth Circuit replaced Judge Hand's "indepen-
dent character" standard in Nichols41 with its new "story being
told" standard. Although this standard protects authors' rights to
reuse their characters, it may have the adverse affect of excluding
virtually any character from copyright protection, as it essentially
relegates fictional characters to the public domain. According to
this court, a character cannot receive copyright protection unless
the character itself is the story. Professor Nimmer interprets this
ruling as denying copyright protections for all fictional characters,
because it "envisage[s] a 'story' devoid of plot wherein character
study constitutes all, or substantially all, of the work."42
The "story being told" standard has been widely used to de-
termine copyright cases. For example, when Universal brought suit
against a manufacturer of merchandise bearing the inscriptions,
"E.T. Phone Home, ' 43 the court found that the E.T. character was
a central component of the movie (E.T. - The Extra-Terrestrial),
being "a unique and distinctive character about whom the movie
revolves," 4 thus entitling Universal to relief. Using Sam Spade
language, the court concluded E.T. was "more than a vehicle for
telling the story, and actually constituted the story being told. 4 5
The "story being told" standard has also been used to deny protec-
tion for fictional characters. The character Jessica in the film Be-
yond the Door, for instance, was found not to infringe upon the
Regan character in The Exorcist, because the story was not subor-
dinated to the Regan character.46
2. Extending the Character into Subsequent Works
Another void in copyright law may occur when a character is
used in a series of works. When part of a series enters the public
domain, the characters appearing in that work may. be copied even
when subsequent parts of the series are still protected by copy-
right.4 7 This problem becomes readily apparent when characters
41. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
42. Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-175.
43. Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 1982 Copyright L. Decisions (CCH)
25,452 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
44. Id. at 1 17,684.
45. Id. at 1 17,685. For additional discussion, see Brylawski, "E.T.: An Extraterrestrial
Caught in a Copyright Dilemma, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395 (1984).
46. Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures Int'l., 403 F. Supp. 522, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
47. See Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-178. See also Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
256 P.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1953); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 520 F.2d 499
(1st Cir. 1975).
1992]
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cross mediums. When a character appears in a movie based on a
public domain novel, for instance, the character may be entitled to
protection for any new traits or elements added in the movie, but
would not be protected as to elements included in the original
novel.48 This was clearly demonstrated in Silverman v. CBS,
49
where CBS alleged a musical play infringed upon its Amos n' Andy
characters. The court permitted the play to use the character traits
which had been developed during CBS's early radio scripts that
had entered the public domain, but protected the traits which had
been added in the later scripts and television programs that were
still under copyright protection.50
3. Visual Characters v. Literary Characters
No clear distinction exists between the legal protection for
purely literary characters and characters which have become "visu-
alized." This has resulted in inconsistent and confusing rulings
with visual characters tending to receive far more protection than
literary characters. The Copyright Act defines "audio-visual"
works as "works that consist of a series of images which are intrin-
sically intended to be shown . . . in films or tapes."' 51 Cartoon
characters are the most prevalent visual characters. The readily
identifiable visual image inherent in cartoon characters makes it
easier to identify these characters as "expressions." This provides
courts with a higher degree of comfort (whether using the Nichols
or the "story being told" test) in determining copyrightability and
granting protection for cartoon characters.
A leading case in cartoon character protection is Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates,2 where the court found the Mickey
Mouse character to be protectable apart from the stories in which
he appeared. Although Air Pirate's mouse had a completely differ-
ent name and personality, and appeared in different situations
than Mickey Mouse, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the visual
similarities of the two characters were still substantial enough to
constitute infringement. Also, the court found that "copying a
comic book character's graphic image constitutes copying to an ex-
tent sufficient to justify a finding of infringement.""3 Air Pirates
48. Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-178.
49. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3219 (1989).
50. Id. at 50.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
52. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
53. Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:331
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exemplifies how courts may look only to the graphic similarities,
ignoring character traits and personalities, to determine infringe-
ment of cartoon characters.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp.,54 Mc-
Donald's commercials featuring "McDonaldLand" characters
(Ronald McDonald et al.) were found to so closely resemble the
total concept and "feel" of Krofft's Puff'n'Stuff television show as
to constitute infringement. The Krofft decision represents an im-
portant landmark in character protection, as the court delved
deeper than mere visual images, recognizing that characters de-
velop personalities and interaction in particular ways that tran-
scend mere physical appearances. 55 Krofft further demonstrates an
increased scrutiny into character persona as the court looked be-
yond the individual characters themselves and considered the en-
tire setting of the television show and commercials.
Krofft's recognition of a character's personality has been fur-
ther extended. In Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Co.,56 Warner Brothers claimed ABC's Great American Hero tele-
vision character infringed upon Warner's Superman character. The
court acknowledged that although Superman was sufficiently de-
veloped to warrant copyright protection, ABC's "Hero" did not
capture the "total concept and feel" of Superman in order to jus-
tify injunctive relief.57 In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products,"
Kenner claimed Ideal's "Star Team" toys infringed upon Kenner's
"Star Wars" characters. The court observed that, although the
Star Wars characters possessed physical traits and character, Ken-
ner's toys had not developed a character, and thus any comparison
had to be made solely on physical appearances.59
Literary characters, however, are more difficult to define than
visual characters, and thus present a more difficult legal challenge.
There are no clear-cut guidelines as to which standards or tests to
apply. No matter which of these tests are applied, further difficul-
ties arise in defining whether a character is "distinctively deline-
ated" or "the story being told" when the character has not yet ap-
peared in an identifiable visual form. Courts, therefore, often find
it easier to simply deny copyright protection for a literary charac-
54. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 1167.
56. 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), af'd 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
57. Id. at 241-243.
58. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. Id. at 301. Any physical similarities which did exist were found not substantial. Id.
at 303.
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ter altogether, rather than interpreting unclear guidelines or trying
to create new standards.
Literary character protection was brought to light in Nichols,0
with Judge Hand's much-cited quote, "the less developed the char-
acters, the less they can be copyrighted: that is the penalty an au-
thor must bear for marking them too indistinctly."'" Although very
few infringement cases concern strictly literary characters, the lit-
erary aspects of a character are sometimes used to determine a
case. The author's literary works in his Tarzan character, for ex-
ample, were found to have been infringed upon by the defendant's
X-rated film Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta,62 but not infringed by
a later MGM Tarzan movie.6
Infringement of literary characters is generally determined
under two criteria: first, which components are to be considered in
distinguishing a character from the literary work in which it ap-
pears, and second, which character traits are used to distinguish
expressions from ideas.
4. Determining Copyrightability
The lack of express copyright protection for fictional charac-
ters complicates the infringement inquiry by forcing the court to
determine whether or not the infringed character is copyrightable.
Courts are left to interpret and apply unclear principles regarding
delineation and infringement, which often leads to murky stan-
dards and inconsistent rulings.
5. Pure Characters
Copyright law may provide little or no protection for the cre-
ators of a "pure character" (a character who does not appear in an
incorporated work). Because the 1976 Copyright Act protects
"works," but not characters, 4 a performer who creates and devel-
ops characters such as "Wayne and Garth," "Pee Wee Herman,"
"Ernest," or the "Church Lady" may not have any copyright pro-
tection in that character unless and until it has been incorporated
60. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Mann, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
63. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 519 F.Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 683
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982)(holding the copyright in the literary work Tarzan of the Apes did
not protect the plot alone, "leaving the characters free for public exploitation." Id. at 391).
Using the first prong of Nichols, the court found that Tarzan was sufficiently well developed
and distinctively delineated the works of Burroughs to be copyrightable. Id.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
[Vol. 9:331
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into an underlying work. This was evidenced in Columbia Broad-
casting System v. DeCosta,65 where actor Victor DeCosta sued
CBS for infringing upon his pure character "Paladin" in CBS' tele-
vision series Have Gun Will Travel.6 Although CBS clearly copied
even small details of the DeCosta's Paladin 1 DeCosta was still de-
nied relief because his pure character had never been incorporated
into any "work. '68
6. Characters Not Widely Known
No matter how blatant an infringer's copying, the creator of a
character may still be precluded from recovery if the character is
not "sufficiently developed" to warrant copyright protection under
the Nichols two-prong test. 9 Under the Nichols standard, a char-
acter's original creator may have no protection against an infring-
ing author who places a copy of that same (copied) character in a
copyrighted work before the original author does.70 Even if the
Sam Spade71 test is used (rather than the Nichols test), the char-
acter would still be vulnerable to infringement because a character
cannot receive copyright protection unless the character is itself
the "story being told. '72
V. ALTERNATE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR PROTECTION
Because copyright law leaves the major voids discussed above,
plaintiffs, as well as courts, may need to rely upon alternative doc-
trines of law, such as trademark or dilution, to "find" legal protec-
tion for fictional characters. This may result, however, in inappro-
priate applications of these alternative doctrines to fit character
protection needs. Furthermore, the entire purpose for relying on
these alternatives in the first place may still not be met, as these
65. 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967).
66. Id. at 316.
67. The CBS character, like DeCosta's character, was also named "Paladin," was a
"good guy" wearing a black outfit, had a mustache, was based out of San Francisco, used a
chess knight as a "trademark," and handed out business cards bearing the chess knight and
the inscription, "have Gun Will Travel. Wire Paladin, San Francisco." Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 321. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
70. See Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, 1982 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 25,460
(C.D. Cal. 1982)(enjoining the sale and distribution of Defendant's "I.T." doll that infringed
on the copyrightable E.T. character)(discussed in Brylawski, E.T.: An Extraterrestrial
Caught in a Copyright Dilemma, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 395 (1984)).
71. 216 F.2d 945. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
72. Id. See also, Nimmer, § 2.12 at 2-175.
1992]
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other doctrines may also fail to provide adequate protection for
fictional characters.
1. Trademark and Unfair Competition
Trademark and unfair .competition are the primary alterna-
tives to copyright law for finding protection of fictional characters.
Trademark law is governed by the federal Lanham Act,73 which
reaches any "word, name, symbol or device used by a manufacturer
or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others. '7 4 The Act requires the registrant
to use the trademark in commerce, but does 'not attach automati-
cally when the character is created.7
Trademark law primarily protects against using "a false desig-
nation of origin, or any false description or representation." 76
When applied to character protection, trademark law focuses on
the extent to which a character symbolizes or is associated with its
author, rather than the development of the character emphasized
in copyright. As with copyright, trademark also relies upon a two-
prong test to determine infringement: First, the character must
achieve a "secondary meaning" ("does the public associate the
character's name with the particular product being sold?") and, if
so, the creator must show a likelihood of consumer confusion ("is
the use of the character's name by another likely to deceive and
confuse the public as to the source of the goods?") 77
Trademarks may protect fictional characters who have ac-
quired a "secondary meaning" with one particular source, includ-
ing Mickey Mouse 78 The Lone Rangere79 Mutt and Jeff,"0 and even
a television character based upon a historical figure, Wyatt Earp.81
This protection may, however, fall short for characters which
are associated with more than one source, as evidenced by Univer-
73. Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. at § 1051.
76. Id. at § 1125(a).
77. See Nimmer, § 2.16; J.T. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:1
(2d ed. 1984). See also Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.
1984); Boston Pro. Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975); Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1951); Tomlin v.
Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226 (1971).
78. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977).
79. Lone Ranger v. Curray, 79 F. Supp. 190, 196 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
80. Fisher v. Star, 231 N.Y. 414 (1921).
81. Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sakman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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sal City Studios v. Nintendo Co.," where Universal alleged that
Nintendo's "Donkey Kong" video game infringed upon Universal's
trademark in King Kong. The court found King Kong could not
acquire a secondary meaning because the rights to King Kong were
divided among numerous owners and not clearly associated with
Universal. 3 Furthermore, even if King Kong had acquired the req-
uisite secondary meaning associated with Universal, trademark
protection was still precluded because there was no likelihood of
consumer confusion.8 4 The court, therefore, denied Universal's
claim holding "that the vagueness of the image in which Universal
claimed a trademark right violates the fundamental purpose of a
trademark: to identify the source of the product and thereby pre-
vent consumer confusion as to the source."8 5
Trademark and unfair competition offer several advantages
over copyright law for licensed character protection. Protected "in-
gredients" are broader under a trademark than a copyright regime
and may include a character's name (Tarzan),86 physical appear-
ance and costumes (Superman), 87 phrases associated with a charac-
ter ("Phone home,"88 "Hi-yo Silver, Away!"),89 and even the
"marks, symbols, and design elements" of a television series car
(The Dukes of Hazard's "General Lee").90
Another advantage over copyright law is that an unfair compe-
tition claim will not be precluded by the author's failure to obtain
(or retain) a trademark registration,"' whereas failure to obtain a
copyright could relegate the author's work into the "public do-
main," thus precluding copyright protection.2 A trademark can
also preserve a character indefinitely (as compared to the "life plus
82. 578 F. Supp. 911, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984).
83. Id. at 925. (King Kong has not only been widely merchandised by numerous own-
ers, but the merchandizing covered the use of different King Kong images, from the original
1933 movie, its Son of King sequel and the 1976 remake. Id. at 914.
84. Id. at 929.
85. Id. at 924.
86. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Mann, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (the
source of the movie, Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta was likely to be confused with the
publicly-recognized name "Tarzan").
87. DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assoc., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
88. Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 1982 Copyright L. Decisions (CCH)
25,452 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
89. Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th cir. 1942).
90. Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981); Processed Plastic Co. v.
Warner Comm., Inc., 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. See Brylawski, "Protection of Characters - Sam Spade Revisited," 22 Bull. Cr.
Soc. 77, 98 (1974).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1988).
19921
13
Spahn: The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters
Published by Institutional Repository, 1992
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
fifty years" copyright protection), although trademark protection
may be lost by actual abandonment or through public treatment of
the trademark. Trademark may also provide a broader scope of
remedies, as it allows for damage awards and injunctive relief.9 3
Although trademark and unfair competition does fill in some
of the gaps left open by copyright law, it also leaves several major
voids; primarily in that a character is not protected unless it has
acquired a "secondary meaning." This may shelter the well-estab-
lished character, but it leaves a major void in protecting new char-
acters, unsuccessful works, most literary works, or even well estab-
lished characters which the public does not associate with a single
source (as with King Kong 4). Even if the character does develop
wide recognition public association with the source, the author or
owner may be denied trademark protection if it cannot be demon-
strated that a likelihood of consumer confusion exists. Trademark
and unfair competition thus places increased burdens of proof on
the creator and may still not protect many characters or character
elements. Trademark protection may therefore be of limited use in
many cases, and may even have the adverse result of creating a
false sense of security.
2. Right of Publicity
When trademark and unfair competition law does not ade-
quately fill the voids left in copyright law, authors may turn to the
right of publicity doctrine to protect their fictional characters.95
Right of publicity is an outgrowth of the common law right of pri-
vacy doctrine, which provides protection from commercial ex-
ploitation of one's own names and likeness, and prevents unautho-
rized exploitation by others. Although primarily intended to
protect public figures from unauthorized commercial exploitation
of their names and likenesses, right of publicity has been applied
to fictional characters. Right of publicity was relied upon, for ex-
ample, to protect the Marx Brothers characters from being recre-
ated in a musical play."' The court acknowledged that copyright
law would not protect human characteristics apart from some pro-
93. See Restatement 2d, Torts § 729; David Nimmer, "Copyright and Quasi-Copyright
Protection for Characters, Titles, and Phonograph Records" 59 TRADEMARK REP. 63 (1969).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
95. See "The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case of a Federal Statute," 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1179 (1987).
96. Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F.Supp. 485, 492-3 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tected "work", but found the play "infringed the plaintiff's rights
of publicity in the Marx Brothers characters."9
Right of publicity was also relied upon (although unsuccess-
fully) in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures," where the court held that
Bela Lugosi's heirs were not entitled to protection for Lugosi's por-
trayal of Dracula. The court focused more on Lugosi than on his
Dracula expression, thus exemplifying how the right of publicity
may be misinterpreted when applied to fictional characters by con-
fusing the creator with the character.
3. Misappropriation
Protection for fictional characters has also been found under
the misappropriation doctrine. Misappropriation may fill the major
void left open by trademark law, as it does not require any "likeli-
hood of public confusion" to extend protection to a character.
The misappropriation principle was established in Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press,99 where the Supreme
Court held that INS's actions taking AP's early news bulletins and
then selling this news to AP's own competitors "misappropriated"
AP's news gathering work and that INS had "appropriat[ed] to it-
self the harvest of those who have sown."'' 00
An action for misappropriation generally requires three ele-
ments.10 1 First, the "thing" allegedly appropriated (the "quasi-
property") must be created by a substantial investment of time,
effort, and money. 102 Second, the defendant must appropriate this
"thing" at little or no cost, thus "attempting to reap where it has
not sown."'01 3 Third, the plaintiff must be injured by the misappro-
priation, ordinarily by a diversion of profits. 04 The standards as to
what constitutes the "appropriation" of this work, and how to
measure the plaintiff's damages, still remain undefined.0 5
Misappropriation has been used in some character protection
cases, but has been applied inconsistently and sporadically. Courts
97. Id. at 494 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
98. 603 P.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1974).
99. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
100. Id. at 239-40.
101. For a discussion of the three requisite elements, and the misappropriation doc-
trine in general, see I.J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 10:25 (2d ed.
1984); Abrams, "Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statu-
tory Limits of State Law Protection" 1983 Sup. CT. REv 509, 513 (1983).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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often refer to "misappropriation" as one of its three main ele-
ments, yet decide the case on copyright or trademark grounds.oe
4. Dilution
Another means of "finding" character protection is through
"dilution." This consists of the diminution or "whittling away" of
the value of a name or mark's hold on the public mind.10 7 The di-
lution theory assumes that a unique mark should be protected as a
property right and, as with misappropriation, does not rely upon
the "public confusion" requisite of trademark infringement.0 8
Several states have enacted specific anti-dilution statutes.
New York, for example, prohibits "acts resulting in a likelihood of
injury. . . or dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade
name," regardless of whether such mark is registered or not."0 9 The
New York statute, however, only provides for injunctive relief
while monetary damages must be sought under other grounds." 0
Dilution has been used to protect the names, likenesses, and other
identifying traits of fictional characters, including Superman and
Wonderwoman,"' the Peanuts characters," 2 and Tarzan."3 Dilu-
tion has, however, also been used to deny relief for alleged in-
fringement of characters, including Superman (by ABC's "The
Great American Hero")," 4 King Kong (against Nintendo's Donkey
106. See Conan Properties v. Conan's Pizza, 752 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985)("the defend-
ant appropriated and used [plaintiff's Conan character] without [plaintiff's] authority." Id.
at 155-56) (emphasis added); Lone Ranger v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th cir. 1942); Universal
City Studios v. Kamar, 1982 Copyright L. Decisions (CCH) 25,452 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Supe-
rior Models, Inc. v. Tolkien Enters., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 587 (D. Del. 1981) (finding "misap-
propriation" of The Hobbit characters).
107. See Frank Schecter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protections," 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 813 (1927).
108. Id.
109. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
110. Id.
111. DC Comics v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F.Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(finding defendant's costumes presented a "clear likelihood of dilution of the distinctive
quality of plaintiff's trademarks and trade names." Id. at 115) (emphasis added).
112. United Features Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F.Supp. 1475 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (de-
fendant's molds were "likely to dilute the distinctive quality of plaintiff's proprietary rights
in the names and likenesses and good will of [the Peanuts] characters." Id. at 1479) (empha-
sis added).
113. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Mann, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(defendant's use of the title "Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta" for an X-rated film would
dilute the value of plaintiff's strong mark Tarzan) (emphasis added).
114. Warner Bros., 720 F.2d 231 (concluding the Great American Hero series could
not "blur or tarnish [Superman's] marks.") Id. at 248
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Kong) ,11 and Godzilla (against Sears' "Bagzilla")."'1
VI. CONCLUSION
Fictional characters have become an increasingly important el-
ement of modern culture, yet they are generally ignored by current
laws, and, even if covered, are seldom provided with adequate pro-
tection against infringement. Copyright law does not specifically
address fictional characters, leaving courts to wrestle with ambigu-
ous and uncertain standards. Even when copyright protection does
exist, it may extend only to the protected "work" in which the
character appears and not to the character itself. This ignores the
reality that characters may be independently valuable apart from
any "work" in which they appear and results in many voids in legal
protection, especially for works which have not yet been copy-
righted, literary characters, pure characters, and even for charac-
ters in copyrighted works which migrate to new works and other
mediums.
Authors of characters may therefore turn to other bodies of
law, such as trademark law, the right of publicity doctrine, or the
dilution theory to "find" legal protection for their characters.
These alternatives, however, also fail to specifically address fic-
tional characters and are often applied inconsistently and incor-
rectly, especially as they are extended beyond their conceptual
purpose to reach characters.
Trademark and unfair competition require a character to ac-
quire a "secondary meaning" with a widely-recognized source in
order to receive protection and further requires a showing of a
"likelihood of public confusion." Right of publicity may provide
protection against commercial exploitation of an actor's name,
face, or voice, but it is not easily applied to, nor does it provide for
the adequate protection of fictional characters. Even when recog-
nized, the right of publicity may not be considered a descendable
right, and may terminate upon the creator's death. Misappropria-
tion is open-ended and loosely defined, and often confused with
other doctrines. Dilution is also loosely defined, is not recognized
in all states, and does not usually provide for any monetary relief.
Another danger of relying upon these uncertain doctrines is that
over extending character protection may remove too much from
115. Universal City Studios, 746 F.2d 112 (see supra notes 82-85).
116. Toho Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding Sears's
use of "Bagzilla" (trash bags) did not "tarnish, degrade, or dilute the distinctive quality of
Godzilla.") Id. at 793.
1992]
17
Spahn: The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters
Published by Institutional Repository, 1992
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
the public domain and unnecessarily limit competition.
The need for a separate category of law expressly for fictional
character protection would seem appropriate and the call for such
an amendment to the Copyright Act is gaining support. This sepa-
rate category would eliminate much of the confusion and inconsis-
tency resulting from the current lack of express character protec-
tion. Creating this express category would establish a clear
foundation on which to decide such cases, allow for more consis-
tent bargaining of ownership rights of characters, and protect
human characters and "pure characters" from unautl.,Orized
infringement.
Kenneth E. Spahn*
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